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HR 10752 — CISA Securing AI Task Force Act
Freedom score: -1 (scale −10 to +10)
- Individual rights: 0
- Property rights: 0
- Economic freedom: 0
- Privacy & due process: 0
- Government power: -1
Sponsor: Rep. Carter, Troy A. [D-LA-2] · Latest action: Referred to the House Committee on Homeland Security. (2026-10-06)
Full text on GovInfo (introduced version) · Congress.gov · ← Bill Library index
Findings — 6 highlighted provisions
Each item below is one provision documented in the findings file. The same provision is highlighted in the full text underneath, with its section citation and criterion. Everything else on this page is plain, unreviewed bill text.
- Sec. 1 — Names the CISA Securing AI Task Force Act See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a)(1)–(5) · Government Power — Directs coordination of AI security design/deployment work and review/update recommendations for CISA guidance/programs; promotes defensive uses of AI and advice to stakeholders on cyber risks. These are agency functions, not new statutory mandates on private AI developers See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a)(6)–(8) · Government Power — Identifies internal staffing gaps, coordinates promotion of secure AI software, and recommends additional CISA initiatives. The task force can recommend, but §2 does not itself give it regulatory or subpoena powers See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a)(9)–(10) · Government Power — Directs CISA AI efforts to meet appropriate privacy, civil rights and liberties standards and to support publication/accuracy of the agency’s own AI-use inventory. No new authority to demand a registry of private firms’ models is provided See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(b)–(c) · Government Power — Requires briefings to two homeland security congressional committees every six months, beginning within six months of establishment. The Act ceases to have effect five years after enactment, limiting duration See in text ↓
Full text (introduced version)
14 of 14 text blocks highlighted. Source: GovInfo, fetched cached.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
Sec. 1 — Names the CISA Securing AI Task Force Act
SEC. 2. TASK FORCE ON SECURING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.
Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts
Sec. 2(a)(1)–(5) · Government Power — Directs coordination of AI security design/deployment work and review/update recommendations for CISA guidance/programs; promotes defensive uses of AI and advice to stakeholders on cyber risks. These are agency functions, not new statutory mandates on private AI developers
Sec. 2(a)(6)–(8) · Government Power — Identifies internal staffing gaps, coordinates promotion of secure AI software, and recommends additional CISA initiatives. The task force can recommend, but §2 does not itself give it regulatory or subpoena powers
Sec. 2(a)(9)–(10) · Government Power — Directs CISA AI efforts to meet appropriate privacy, civil rights and liberties standards and to support publication/accuracy of the agency’s own AI-use inventory. No new authority to demand a registry of private firms’ models is provided
Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts
Sec. 2(a)(1)–(5) · Government Power — Directs coordination of AI security design/deployment work and review/update recommendations for CISA guidance/programs; promotes defensive uses of AI and advice to stakeholders on cyber risks. These are agency functions, not new statutory mandates on private AI developers
Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts
Sec. 2(a)(1)–(5) · Government Power — Directs coordination of AI security design/deployment work and review/update recommendations for CISA guidance/programs; promotes defensive uses of AI and advice to stakeholders on cyber risks. These are agency functions, not new statutory mandates on private AI developers
Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts
Sec. 2(a)(1)–(5) · Government Power — Directs coordination of AI security design/deployment work and review/update recommendations for CISA guidance/programs; promotes defensive uses of AI and advice to stakeholders on cyber risks. These are agency functions, not new statutory mandates on private AI developers
Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts
Sec. 2(a)(1)–(5) · Government Power — Directs coordination of AI security design/deployment work and review/update recommendations for CISA guidance/programs; promotes defensive uses of AI and advice to stakeholders on cyber risks. These are agency functions, not new statutory mandates on private AI developers
Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts
Sec. 2(a)(1)–(5) · Government Power — Directs coordination of AI security design/deployment work and review/update recommendations for CISA guidance/programs; promotes defensive uses of AI and advice to stakeholders on cyber risks. These are agency functions, not new statutory mandates on private AI developers
Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts
Sec. 2(a)(6)–(8) · Government Power — Identifies internal staffing gaps, coordinates promotion of secure AI software, and recommends additional CISA initiatives. The task force can recommend, but §2 does not itself give it regulatory or subpoena powers
Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts
Sec. 2(a)(6)–(8) · Government Power — Identifies internal staffing gaps, coordinates promotion of secure AI software, and recommends additional CISA initiatives. The task force can recommend, but §2 does not itself give it regulatory or subpoena powers
Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts
Sec. 2(a)(6)–(8) · Government Power — Identifies internal staffing gaps, coordinates promotion of secure AI software, and recommends additional CISA initiatives. The task force can recommend, but §2 does not itself give it regulatory or subpoena powers
Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts
Sec. 2(a)(9)–(10) · Government Power — Directs CISA AI efforts to meet appropriate privacy, civil rights and liberties standards and to support publication/accuracy of the agency’s own AI-use inventory. No new authority to demand a registry of private firms’ models is provided
Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts
Sec. 2(a)(9)–(10) · Government Power — Directs CISA AI efforts to meet appropriate privacy, civil rights and liberties standards and to support publication/accuracy of the agency’s own AI-use inventory. No new authority to demand a registry of private firms’ models is provided
Sec. 2(b)–(c) · Government Power — Requires briefings to two homeland security congressional committees every six months, beginning within six months of establishment. The Act ceases to have effect five years after enactment, limiting duration
Sec. 2(b)–(c) · Government Power — Requires briefings to two homeland security congressional committees every six months, beginning within six months of establishment. The Act ceases to have effect five years after enactment, limiting duration
Findings source: bill-scores-v2-batch45-findings-2026-11-15.md. Highlights come only from that file; no finding, score, or provision was invented for this page.
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