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HR 10804 — Utility Accountability Act
Freedom score: -3 (scale −10 to +10)
- Individual rights: 0
- Property rights: -1
- Economic freedom: -1
- Privacy & due process: 0
- Government power: -1
Sponsor: Rep. Riley, Josh [D-NY-19] · Latest action: Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. (2026-10-13)
Full text on GovInfo (introduced version) · Congress.gov · ← Bill Library index
Findings — 7 highlighted provisions
Each item below is one provision documented in the findings file. The same provision is highlighted in the full text underneath, with its section citation and criterion. Everything else on this page is plain, unreviewed bill text.
- Sec. 1 — gives the short title See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a) — directs State regulatory authorities that already annually audit investor-owned electric utilities subject to their ratemaking authority for State performance standards to certify annually to the U.S. Energy Secretary whether each utility met those standards. It does not itself require every State to create audits or uniform federal performance standards See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(b)(1)(A) — requires the Energy Secretary, after a State certification of failure, to order the State regulatory authority to direct the failing utility to provide annual credits to every residential customer beginning the next year until compliance; the bill does not require a separate showing that each customer suffered specific loss See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(b)(1)(B) — specifies $100 per customer the first year, increasing by $100 in every subsequent year of noncompliance; no stated annual cap. The repeated escalation affects long-duration exposure See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(b)(1)(C) — requires utility investors, rather than residential customers, to pay for those credits. This is a compelled transfer imposed on shareholder/investor economic interests, not a payment from a new federal appropriation See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(b)(2) — permits the Energy Secretary to withhold assistance to a noncomplying State regulatory authority—including grants, loans, guarantees and technical assistance—until it executes the federal order. This is a federal funding sanction against the authority, distinct from the utility's obligation See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(c)(1)–(3) — adopts PURPA definitions for State/rate authorities and defines "State performance standards" to include reliability and electric safety standards, without an exclusive list or fixed national metric. Ambiguity remains about how broadly existing other State targets are included; timing depends on a State audit and certification See in text ↓
Full text (introduced version)
9 of 9 text blocks highlighted. Source: GovInfo, fetched cached.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
Sec. 1 — gives the short title
SEC. 2. PENALTIES FOR FAILURE OF INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES TO MEET STATE PERFORMANCE TARGETS.
Sec. 2(a) — directs State regulatory authorities that already annually audit investor-owned electric utilities subject to their ratemaking authority for State performance standards to certify annually to the U.S. Energy Secretary whether each utility met those standards. It does not itself require every State to create audits or uniform federal performance standards
Sec. 2(b)(1)(A) — requires the Energy Secretary, after a State certification of failure, to order the State regulatory authority to direct the failing utility to provide annual credits to every residential customer beginning the next year until compliance; the bill does not require a separate showing that each customer suffered specific loss
Sec. 2(b)(1)(B) — specifies $100 per customer the first year, increasing by $100 in every subsequent year of noncompliance; no stated annual cap. The repeated escalation affects long-duration exposure
Sec. 2(b)(1)(C) — requires utility investors, rather than residential customers, to pay for those credits. This is a compelled transfer imposed on shareholder/investor economic interests, not a payment from a new federal appropriation
Sec. 2(b)(2) — permits the Energy Secretary to withhold assistance to a noncomplying State regulatory authority—including grants, loans, guarantees and technical assistance—until it executes the federal order. This is a federal funding sanction against the authority, distinct from the utility's obligation
Sec. 2(b)(1)(A) — requires the Energy Secretary, after a State certification of failure, to order the State regulatory authority to direct the failing utility to provide annual credits to every residential customer beginning the next year until compliance; the bill does not require a separate showing that each customer suffered specific loss
Sec. 2(b)(1)(B) — specifies $100 per customer the first year, increasing by $100 in every subsequent year of noncompliance; no stated annual cap. The repeated escalation affects long-duration exposure
Sec. 2(b)(1)(C) — requires utility investors, rather than residential customers, to pay for those credits. This is a compelled transfer imposed on shareholder/investor economic interests, not a payment from a new federal appropriation
Sec. 2(b)(2) — permits the Energy Secretary to withhold assistance to a noncomplying State regulatory authority—including grants, loans, guarantees and technical assistance—until it executes the federal order. This is a federal funding sanction against the authority, distinct from the utility's obligation
Sec. 2(c)(1)–(3) — adopts PURPA definitions for State/rate authorities and defines "State performance standards" to include reliability and electric safety standards, without an exclusive list or fixed national metric. Ambiguity remains about how broadly existing other State targets are included; timing depends on a State audit and certification
Sec. 2(c)(1)–(3) — adopts PURPA definitions for State/rate authorities and defines "State performance standards" to include reliability and electric safety standards, without an exclusive list or fixed national metric. Ambiguity remains about how broadly existing other State targets are included; timing depends on a State audit and certification
Sec. 2(c)(1)–(3) — adopts PURPA definitions for State/rate authorities and defines "State performance standards" to include reliability and electric safety standards, without an exclusive list or fixed national metric. Ambiguity remains about how broadly existing other State targets are included; timing depends on a State audit and certification
Sec. 2(c)(1)–(3) — adopts PURPA definitions for State/rate authorities and defines "State performance standards" to include reliability and electric safety standards, without an exclusive list or fixed national metric. Ambiguity remains about how broadly existing other State targets are included; timing depends on a State audit and certification
Findings source: bill-scores-v2-batch42-findings-2026-11-15.md. Highlights come only from that file; no finding, score, or provision was invented for this page.
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