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HR 10832 — IRAN Act
Freedom score: 0 (scale −10 to +10)
- Individual rights: +1
- Property rights: 0
- Economic freedom: 0
- Privacy & due process: 0
- Government power: -1
Sponsor: Rep. Tenney, Claudia [R-NY-24] · Latest action: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. (2026-10-15)
Full text on GovInfo (introduced version) · Congress.gov · ← Bill Library index
Findings — 15 highlighted provisions
Each item below is one provision documented in the findings file. The same provision is highlighted in the full text underneath, with its section citation and criterion. Everything else on this page is plain, unreviewed bill text.
- Sec. 3(a)(1)(C), proposed Iran Threat Reduction Act § 414(a)(11) · Individual Rights — Requires evaluation of VPNs, decentralized and peer-to-peer networks, direct-to-cell satellite systems, and other circumvention tools for Iranian civil society and human-rights activists. Affected: Federal strategists and intended beneficiaries abroad. Enforcement: Federal strategy/review duties, not penalties against private users See in text ↓
- Proposed § 414(a)(12)–(13) · Individual Rights — Requires federal coordination to facilitate lawful provision of open-internet technologies and a strategy for circumventing Iranian internet blackouts. Enforcement: Interagency planning and reporting See in text ↓
- Sec. 5(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Requires State to seek cybersecurity training, secure communication tools, and multilingual educational materials for journalists, human-rights defenders, and civil society actors in Iran. Affected: Intended overseas beneficiaries and federal administrators. Enforcement: Federal program and reporting duties, not new obligations on Iranian citizens See in text ↓
- Proposed § 414(a)(12) · Economic Freedom — Directs coordination with Treasury and Commerce to enable companies to provide lawful internet-access tools to Iranian civilians, expressly subject to existing sanctions and export controls. Affected: Agencies and interested technology providers. Enforcement: Existing restrictions continue to apply See in text ↓
- Sec. 4(a)(1)–(2) · Economic Freedom — Requires the FCC, when considering new or modified direct-to-cell or satellite licenses and market-access grants, to consider encouraging licensees not to intentionally disable, degrade, or geoblock Iran coverage, subject to legal, interference, and network-security exceptions. Affected: FCC and satellite operators. Enforcement: Licensing consideration; the bill does not expressly impose an unconditional coverage mandate See in text ↓
- Sec. 6(a)–(b) · Economic Freedom — Authorizes $15 million annually for FY2027 and FY2028 for the Secs. 4–5 activities, with appropriated amounts authorized to remain available until expended. Enforcement: Federal appropriations/program administration; an authorization is not an appropriation See in text ↓
- Sec. 5(a)(2)–(3) · Privacy and Due Process — Directs attention to tools that minimize detection risks, including VPNs and end-to-end encrypted messaging. No compulsory personal surveillance or reporting is created See in text ↓
- Sec. 3(a)(1) · Government Power — Amends the existing Iran internet-freedom strategy to include circumvention technology, commercial access, and blackout resilience See in text ↓
- Sec. 3(a)(1)(D), proposed § 414(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires regular interagency strategy review and submission of updated strategies to Congress, including implementation progress and coordination assessments See in text ↓
- Sec. 3(a)(2)(A)–(C) · Government Power — Requires the first updated strategy within 120 days after enactment, in unclassified form with an optional classified annex; states that subsequent updates should occur at least annually See in text ↓
- Sec. 4(a) · Government Power — Adds an FCC licensing consideration, subject to specified exceptions See in text ↓
- Sec. 4(b) · Government Power — Expresses a nonbinding congressional view about U.S. advocacy at international telecommunications bodies See in text ↓
- Sec. 4(c)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires a State Department briefing within 180 days and annually for five years on relevant international advocacy and known satellite-coverage exclusions See in text ↓
- Sec. 5(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires effectiveness assessments and a GAO evaluation within three years See in text ↓
- Sec. 7(1)–(3) · Government Power — Defines the appropriate congressional committees, direct-to-cell communications, and relevant satellite communications See in text ↓
Full text (introduced version)
30 of 44 text blocks highlighted. Source: GovInfo, fetched cached.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.
SEC. 3. IMPROVED COORDINATION OF EFFORTS TO PROMOTE INTERNET FREEDOM IN IRAN.
Sec. 3(a)(1)(C), proposed Iran Threat Reduction Act § 414(a)(11) · Individual Rights — Requires evaluation of VPNs, decentralized and peer-to-peer networks, direct-to-cell satellite systems, and other circumvention tools for Iranian civil society and human-rights activists. Affected: Federal strategists and intended beneficiaries abroad. Enforcement: Federal strategy/review duties, not penalties against private users
Sec. 3(a)(1) · Government Power — Amends the existing Iran internet-freedom strategy to include circumvention technology, commercial access, and blackout resilience
Sec. 3(a)(1)(D), proposed § 414(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires regular interagency strategy review and submission of updated strategies to Congress, including implementation progress and coordination assessments
Sec. 3(a)(2)(A)–(C) · Government Power — Requires the first updated strategy within 120 days after enactment, in unclassified form with an optional classified annex; states that subsequent updates should occur at least annually
Sec. 3(a)(1)(C), proposed Iran Threat Reduction Act § 414(a)(11) · Individual Rights — Requires evaluation of VPNs, decentralized and peer-to-peer networks, direct-to-cell satellite systems, and other circumvention tools for Iranian civil society and human-rights activists. Affected: Federal strategists and intended beneficiaries abroad. Enforcement: Federal strategy/review duties, not penalties against private users
Sec. 3(a)(1) · Government Power — Amends the existing Iran internet-freedom strategy to include circumvention technology, commercial access, and blackout resilience
Sec. 3(a)(1)(D), proposed § 414(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires regular interagency strategy review and submission of updated strategies to Congress, including implementation progress and coordination assessments
Sec. 3(a)(1)(C), proposed Iran Threat Reduction Act § 414(a)(11) · Individual Rights — Requires evaluation of VPNs, decentralized and peer-to-peer networks, direct-to-cell satellite systems, and other circumvention tools for Iranian civil society and human-rights activists. Affected: Federal strategists and intended beneficiaries abroad. Enforcement: Federal strategy/review duties, not penalties against private users
Proposed § 414(a)(12)–(13) · Individual Rights — Requires federal coordination to facilitate lawful provision of open-internet technologies and a strategy for circumventing Iranian internet blackouts. Enforcement: Interagency planning and reporting
Proposed § 414(a)(12) · Economic Freedom — Directs coordination with Treasury and Commerce to enable companies to provide lawful internet-access tools to Iranian civilians, expressly subject to existing sanctions and export controls. Affected: Agencies and interested technology providers. Enforcement: Existing restrictions continue to apply
Sec. 3(a)(1)(C), proposed Iran Threat Reduction Act § 414(a)(11) · Individual Rights — Requires evaluation of VPNs, decentralized and peer-to-peer networks, direct-to-cell satellite systems, and other circumvention tools for Iranian civil society and human-rights activists. Affected: Federal strategists and intended beneficiaries abroad. Enforcement: Federal strategy/review duties, not penalties against private users
Proposed § 414(a)(12)–(13) · Individual Rights — Requires federal coordination to facilitate lawful provision of open-internet technologies and a strategy for circumventing Iranian internet blackouts. Enforcement: Interagency planning and reporting
Proposed § 414(a)(12) · Economic Freedom — Directs coordination with Treasury and Commerce to enable companies to provide lawful internet-access tools to Iranian civilians, expressly subject to existing sanctions and export controls. Affected: Agencies and interested technology providers. Enforcement: Existing restrictions continue to apply
Proposed § 414(a)(12)–(13) · Individual Rights — Requires federal coordination to facilitate lawful provision of open-internet technologies and a strategy for circumventing Iranian internet blackouts. Enforcement: Interagency planning and reporting
Sec. 3(a)(1)(D), proposed § 414(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires regular interagency strategy review and submission of updated strategies to Congress, including implementation progress and coordination assessments
Sec. 3(a)(1)(D), proposed § 414(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires regular interagency strategy review and submission of updated strategies to Congress, including implementation progress and coordination assessments
Sec. 3(a)(1)(D), proposed § 414(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires regular interagency strategy review and submission of updated strategies to Congress, including implementation progress and coordination assessments
SEC. 4. SAFEGUARDS FOR DIRECT-TO-CELL AND OTHER SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS COVERAGE.
Sec. 4(a)(1)–(2) · Economic Freedom — Requires the FCC, when considering new or modified direct-to-cell or satellite licenses and market-access grants, to consider encouraging licensees not to intentionally disable, degrade, or geoblock Iran coverage, subject to legal, interference, and network-security exceptions. Affected: FCC and satellite operators. Enforcement: Licensing consideration; the bill does not expressly impose an unconditional coverage mandate
Sec. 4(a) · Government Power — Adds an FCC licensing consideration, subject to specified exceptions
Sec. 4(a)(1)–(2) · Economic Freedom — Requires the FCC, when considering new or modified direct-to-cell or satellite licenses and market-access grants, to consider encouraging licensees not to intentionally disable, degrade, or geoblock Iran coverage, subject to legal, interference, and network-security exceptions. Affected: FCC and satellite operators. Enforcement: Licensing consideration; the bill does not expressly impose an unconditional coverage mandate
Sec. 4(a) · Government Power — Adds an FCC licensing consideration, subject to specified exceptions
Sec. 4(a)(1)–(2) · Economic Freedom — Requires the FCC, when considering new or modified direct-to-cell or satellite licenses and market-access grants, to consider encouraging licensees not to intentionally disable, degrade, or geoblock Iran coverage, subject to legal, interference, and network-security exceptions. Affected: FCC and satellite operators. Enforcement: Licensing consideration; the bill does not expressly impose an unconditional coverage mandate
Sec. 4(a) · Government Power — Adds an FCC licensing consideration, subject to specified exceptions
Sec. 4(b) · Government Power — Expresses a nonbinding congressional view about U.S. advocacy at international telecommunications bodies
Sec. 4(c)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires a State Department briefing within 180 days and annually for five years on relevant international advocacy and known satellite-coverage exclusions
Sec. 4(c)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires a State Department briefing within 180 days and annually for five years on relevant international advocacy and known satellite-coverage exclusions
Sec. 4(c)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires a State Department briefing within 180 days and annually for five years on relevant international advocacy and known satellite-coverage exclusions
SEC. 5. CYBERSECURITY CAPACITY FOR CIVIL SOCIETY IN IRAN.
Sec. 5(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Requires State to seek cybersecurity training, secure communication tools, and multilingual educational materials for journalists, human-rights defenders, and civil society actors in Iran. Affected: Intended overseas beneficiaries and federal administrators. Enforcement: Federal program and reporting duties, not new obligations on Iranian citizens
Sec. 5(a)(2)–(3) · Privacy and Due Process — Directs attention to tools that minimize detection risks, including VPNs and end-to-end encrypted messaging. No compulsory personal surveillance or reporting is created
Sec. 5(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Requires State to seek cybersecurity training, secure communication tools, and multilingual educational materials for journalists, human-rights defenders, and civil society actors in Iran. Affected: Intended overseas beneficiaries and federal administrators. Enforcement: Federal program and reporting duties, not new obligations on Iranian citizens
Sec. 5(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Requires State to seek cybersecurity training, secure communication tools, and multilingual educational materials for journalists, human-rights defenders, and civil society actors in Iran. Affected: Intended overseas beneficiaries and federal administrators. Enforcement: Federal program and reporting duties, not new obligations on Iranian citizens
Sec. 5(a)(2)–(3) · Privacy and Due Process — Directs attention to tools that minimize detection risks, including VPNs and end-to-end encrypted messaging. No compulsory personal surveillance or reporting is created
Sec. 5(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Requires State to seek cybersecurity training, secure communication tools, and multilingual educational materials for journalists, human-rights defenders, and civil society actors in Iran. Affected: Intended overseas beneficiaries and federal administrators. Enforcement: Federal program and reporting duties, not new obligations on Iranian citizens
Sec. 5(a)(2)–(3) · Privacy and Due Process — Directs attention to tools that minimize detection risks, including VPNs and end-to-end encrypted messaging. No compulsory personal surveillance or reporting is created
Sec. 5(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires effectiveness assessments and a GAO evaluation within three years
Sec. 5(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires effectiveness assessments and a GAO evaluation within three years
Sec. 5(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires effectiveness assessments and a GAO evaluation within three years
SEC. 6. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Sec. 6(a)–(b) · Economic Freedom — Authorizes $15 million annually for FY2027 and FY2028 for the Secs. 4–5 activities, with appropriated amounts authorized to remain available until expended. Enforcement: Federal appropriations/program administration; an authorization is not an appropriation
Sec. 6(a)–(b) · Economic Freedom — Authorizes $15 million annually for FY2027 and FY2028 for the Secs. 4–5 activities, with appropriated amounts authorized to remain available until expended. Enforcement: Federal appropriations/program administration; an authorization is not an appropriation
SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.
Sec. 7(1)–(3) · Government Power — Defines the appropriate congressional committees, direct-to-cell communications, and relevant satellite communications
Sec. 7(1)–(3) · Government Power — Defines the appropriate congressional committees, direct-to-cell communications, and relevant satellite communications
Sec. 7(1)–(3) · Government Power — Defines the appropriate congressional committees, direct-to-cell communications, and relevant satellite communications
Sec. 7(1)–(3) · Government Power — Defines the appropriate congressional committees, direct-to-cell communications, and relevant satellite communications
Sec. 7(1)–(3) · Government Power — Defines the appropriate congressional committees, direct-to-cell communications, and relevant satellite communications
SEC. 8. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Findings source: bill-scores-v2-batch39-findings-2026-11-14.md. Highlights come only from that file; no finding, score, or provision was invented for this page.
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